Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout2005-265 Emergency Action Plan - Hosler Dam EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN HOSLER DAM PROJECT NO. 1107 - OREGON CITY OF ASHLAND 20 E. MAIN STREET CITY HALL ASHLAND, OREGON 97520 Revised: April11 1990 May 1991 January 1992 Reprinted: January 1994 June 1998 December 1998 Reprinted: November 2000 March 2001 January 2004 December 2005 G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN HOSLER DAM PROJECT NO. 1107 - OREGON CONTENTS OF PLAN Verification Page PAGE iii I. Notification Flow Charts 1 A. Failure is Imminent or Has Occurred 1 B. Potential Hazard is Developing 1 II. Statement of Purpose 1 III. Project Description 1 IV. Emergency Detection, Evaluation & Classification 2 A. Measure(s) for Detection 2 B. Provisions for Evaluation 3 C. Emergency Classification 3 V. General Responsibilities Under the Emergency Action Plan 4 A. Licensee Responsibilities 4 B. Responsibility for Notification 4 C. Responsibility for Evacuation 4 D. Responsibility for Termination & Follow-Up 5 E. EAP Coordinator Responsibility 5 VI. Notification Procedures - General 6 A. Proposed Action without Warning 7 B. Proposed Action with Prior Indication 8 VII. Preparedness & Preventative Actions 9 A. General Provisions for Surveillance 9 B. Surveillance at Remotely Controlled or Unattended Dams 9 C. Response During Periods of Darkness 10 D. Response During Periods of Adverse Weather 11 E. Availability & Use of Alternative Systems of Communications 11 F. Emergency Supplies & Resources 11 G. Other Concerns & Actions 11 VIII. Appendix 12 A. Plans for Posting the EAP and for Training, Testing & Annual Review 12 B. Documentation 13 C. Inundation Maps 14 G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 CITY OF ASHLAND EAP PAGEili Verification Paae The undersigned, being first duly sworn, states that he has read the following document and knows the contents of it, and that all of the statements contained in that document are true and correct, to the best of his knowledge and belief. State of Oregon ) ) ss: County of Jackson ) Sworn to and subscribed before me by Pieter N. Smeenk this -<I 2005. NOVcw.ber day of ~;)ooombep, OFFICIAL SEAL NANCY E SLOCUM NOTARY PUBLIC - OREGON COMMISSION NO. 371650 MY COMMISSION EXPIRES SEPT. 18, 2007 '--/6/IAf'1 [;', ')~ Not~ry My Commission Expires: 9~ I g -0 7 Seal: G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 1:1 ... &I: &I: = c.:t c.:t = en III: II: &I: = .... z ... z - E E - en - ... &I: = ... - Z! I-a" ~<.90 Iw~ 00:::0 SO 0::: Oow ...lZLL ~::s~ OI~ -(f) !;:<(o::: OLL~ LLO(f) b~g ZIOI 1- I-Ill.. ZW"-OCO ~IN~('i)I ":::UN.,-.,-U I- ""-1- "" , co co , LL. <( co co .,- <( l_ or: U ~ ~ ~ Q.(/) WZ"-"-__ '<;1"'<;1""--0 O<(L{)L{)'<;I" wiii~uJlf.,- S:2wO::~:Jo; 6~00w.... Q.~SIUo ---J 0:: 0 W ~ 1-(9 ('i) z<(L{)~ <1"'Z'<;I"'<;I" --.J<(('i)0) a..~LC{~ o::>-co;J; WWCO, I->~...J ...JU.,-...J U:::~;J;~ 0:: ...J ~~ __ W>--"-W 1-0::0::~ <(<(00 s:1 0 S I I ... I .. .. ... ~ ........'...'....1.:.... it..: J o <0 co 0::0 O~ ~~ 0::-- W.,- a..;J; 0' ~~ ....:J> 00> Il) o - "'l:""" "'l:""" "C Q) tn 'S; Q) a::: (" WI U 5 0:: W (/) 0:: W I - I- L{) L51'-~ S~~ ...J.,-I'- <('I'- Z('i)__ 01'-.,- -t:::'<;I" I-.,-L{) <( '<;I" .... l Z L{) 0.... - .... . . '. (/) . · W. . U. . > ~: .> W .::s _I (/) : :~~b · .UJ~Z . .~W~ . .(/)Uo:: · .ZO::W. · S~~ · .OZW. . 01 W 061 . . . . ..... . . . - 1 Z o ~I 8 ~ N ~I Z W ~ ~I~ ~ (9~ :J~ - zw ' w~ W<O :J (/) ~o 0:: 0 Q. l:= 0>- I'- U <(__ uuo::~ ~...J Q;~ Z Z w;J; W <( 0::1 I- LC{ OW(9' IZujlw~ (/)(9<(~ I-QI-::::iO:: ~ffiz~"D:J&3ill=:!o ~~~S ffi~o::u~s/_ -,W..::: ~ \. f" - ...J ~ 0:: (/) o .,- I 0 ~ ~ Z X :J W ~ 0 ~ ...J 0"-0 U~Z ONO:: ZN<( ::j~~ I--...J (/)~O <(L{)a.. l - .,- .,- '<;I" N 1-:1 N Z ::g Wo::-- ~O~ I-I-L{) 0:: .... <(UOO a..~I'-<o"- LW-:gL{)~ 09L{)q>0 (/)ZcON' ~SCOCO~ ~O~~O) So::~~~ COL!(LC{L{) S:2::j~W~ a5:J~~...J 5:1 or: S ~ ~ 0:::"\ 0:: 0 ~ ~ ~NO::: I-OW (/)Nc.. -1-:::> ZXC/) ~WO::: o -0 <("-u.. ....!..~~ ~~~ WNC/) I~o::: U__:::> 0::"-0 <(;J;J: ~ , 0::: ~~~ <(Ou.. O~S<tJ -' , ('i) .,- '<;I" N , N L{) O::!f? w.,- (9'<;1" <('2 ZOCO <(I'-CO('i) ~ '<;I" L{).,- '----.L- I ('i)N'<;I" _ ~LC{IO ZCON, WCO~~ W~__O) ~.,-.,--- (/);J;;:;1;~ 0:: I I 1.0 W~W~ I-O::~...J wOOW OO::SIU -' r .,- <0 0::0 O~ I-N ULO w!f? 0::"- 1- '<;I" hOL{) Z , .... WOOL{) ~i:iJcoo I-Io.,- O::Ufri9 <((/)IN a.. 0:: CO CO WW~'<;I" OO~~ UZ'<;I"'<;I" -<(L{)LO 0:: > , , I->~W U~O::~ WUOO ml is S I ll.. W -0<0 1-51'-'<;I"~0 Z '~l:=CO;= W>-, 'coo 0:::: W N N , , ":::...JCOCO"-'<;I" 1-0'<;l"'<;I"~1'- O::O~~__I'- or:O'<;l"'<;I"~~ WSIfL!(LO;J; OI~W~I WI-O::~...JO:: o::-OOW(9 itl ~ S I U a.. 1 ~ I 0::1 N 1.0 o gC!;~ !:i: <t'''";"0) 0:: is CO co9 I-...Jcoco.,- t- (/)<(~~<O Z~.,-.,-~ --'<;1"'<;1".,- ~O::LOLO'<;I" O(9~uJL!( ~OOO::~:J I-Z OW <316sIU ~ I- Z W o Z W I- Z a: W Q.('i)('i)LO :JLOI'-N (f) ('i) 0) ('i) (/) -r LC{ "'f 0 ZZCON' OOCOCO~ f=SQ~~O) <(0::.,-.,-__ 0::0::'<;1"'<;1""- WOL!(If;:;1; Q.~~W~ OWO::O~...J S~ OW Q..I~ S I U -I I- Z W o Z W I- Z a: W Q.I'-O) :JLO.,- CI(('i)1'- ZLOI'- OcOJ, (/)CO('i) Z'<;I"LO -- -- I"-.,- 0'<;1"'<;1" ~LOL{) , , I ~~W Oo::~ 00 ....U>I a(/)> - I I .............. .. . . .. · oN........ · ::tNC'0 Rd!;~.. .01t'-((JC'0 Nor........ .ZZ'~SJ~ ...JN~cD.. .::j $.:~ ~ cD <i::g t'- ~.. .1- LiJ !::!2 ~ R I cry 8 cry . . .0:: 0:: ,r') C'0 cry . 0 L() 0.. o 00 I-L() L().. · Q. ~ '~ u;> ~ ~ ~ ',uJ.. .,g:~W....J u..0::~:2: .~ 0:: 1):::2:...J 0:: 0 u:j 0.. .w 1-<( q 0 W .... <( $: () I .. .ll.. 0.. :$: I () 0 I . . . . . . ......... ...... . . . -----.., . r 1 . 1 . I 0:: fril . o ~I : I 5 ~I t'-. 1 0:: ('i) co 0)1 co.. 1 If-W~~~ ::g" Z ~ LC{ "'f ;J;I cO. 1:5 (/) co 1.0 uJ I CO: Iffii:l.0~friz ~ f-: !- ...J ~ ~ 01 '<;1". I<(,Z...J'<;I"'<;I"I 1.0. --I ~ !~ ~ ~ :z ~I ~: [II- !;;r 0:: 0:: 0:::: 1-1 c. I (/) 1.1l 0:: 0 0 :J Q). 1 ~II~I ~ S I 01 ~. L -- - .J 0..: Q) o . en . t . o . S . . . . . . . . " " . " . . .. " . " . <II> " . " . . . <Ii en <II> E · lit C o .. "0 .. Q) II ~ @ C <Ii o II> ro lil E <II .... .2 " C III Q) . :S " ~ . r---.., ...J 1 1 or: , <3 1 1>- ~ 0 I 0:: 0:: ~ I I~ a,.. 1.0, 1 I Z (/) W g ~I 111] ~~, ~: g ;? ;; I I~ ca ~ 1 ...J 0::: 01 IWI:1 <( > .1 co >.J L_:=__.., r- Z I I Q '<;I" I 1 I I- '<;I" U('i)U I W'<;I"I- 1...(/)1<( I~W~fu('i)1 <1"'U:::;J::_OI --.JZ.,-O.,- II~;:;1;O:::h1 ~~W':JLO I-I-~O~I 10ZOI.,- 18 ~ S ~;:;1; I L_.___.J rl l~--I 1- 1 o I l!J I II}:: l-i50co I Iz ''<;I" '<;I" W7('i)NLO 1~(5LC{q;~1 1-(f.)COco'l I 0:: 1- co co .,- <((}::~~<OI ,a.. LU .,- .,- ~ WCD'<;I"'<;I""-, 100LC{LC{;:;1; I~~;~~jl '~(5~OI~1 0.. Cl > .J L____ .~ :0 :J co 0.. M Q) M ..c: 1.0 _ I tl ~ C1l -.:t C o () Q) en C1l Q) 0.. "0 Q) OJ C C1l ..... ..c: I:: () Q) en "'C C1l '0 ..c: I:: 1ij ..c: () ~ o <+= ... Q) "'C I:: l'O E E o u ... Q) ..... I:: Q) U III I:: o ~ l'O ... Q) c.. o >- (,) I:: Q) C'l ... Q) E w CD :z - ~ = ... ... :II ... 1:1 en - 1:1 = =s c =-= ... c - .... :z ... .... = ~ N . .. . ... I-Z 0::01'-- <({!)~ J:w...... ~~~ OOW -.Jzu.. ~:5~ 0J:~ 1-(/)0:: <(<(w Uu..-.J U::O(/) 1->-0 Ol-J: Zu ..- (") ..- ..- "t "t N N I- N ' Z I{) ~ Wo::!:!2 ffi~ ~o~ C>"t 0::1-1{) <(I{) <( 0 '- Zo '- WOo fbo::~<o"- <(I"-~(") Ool{)~~ ~~~~ CI),U;>,o ~I{),O ~ZCON' ZOON I o::S~~~ WCOCO~ 00----O) W~~O) ..-"--- ~..-..--- SO::"t"t..- CI)"t"t"- OCDU(U(~ O::U;>U;>~ -::s~W' W~W I c6:::>O::~:J I-O::~:J :::><(OOw,-!!:!oow a..a..SIOoa..SIO I 00:: LL:::::iO o~g5fo:: sa..l-<i!o !!:!>-o:::>~ GJCDz~a&: 0:: -o::w OOwa.. fiJf=~I-:::> w:3o::~CI) ZI-O cns I 0:: ~ W N I-C> '? z<(l{)..- ::s~~d'; a..~U;>~ O::->-CO~ WWCO, I->~-l :....Io..--l u:~~~ 0:: -l ' -- w>-~w I-:O::O::~ ~~~~ o <0 CO 0::0 O~ ~~ w"- a..~ 0' ~~ .....:::>0 DOS ~. Ill! II) o - 'I("'" 'I("'" "C CD U) 'S; CD (t: .............. . . 0:: NI{) Q g~N r: <O~~ ~_' ,0) I-g~~9 ~<(~~(O z~..-..-~ _ ~ 0:: ~ "t ..- ~c>~~~ ~~g5~0:J UaSI~ . . . ~ T""" 0 .0 ~ ~ ~ R .~ z ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ....J <( N .. ,)... N "'LO('"),,-, ~LO .1- v ~ LO 0 <( LO .0:: ~ ('") M ~ I M .0 ~ 0 0 ('") ~ 0 . 0.... u..... LO LO 0 LO ~uJLO >-~ .0O::a::::2;....J a:::a::: .0:: I- 0 0 ~ a::: 0 w<(> w....<(> .LL 0... > I U 0 I > . . . .............. . . -- ..- <0 0::0 oS'! I-N 01{) w!:!2 0::"- I--"t ZOI{) , '- WOO ~Wcol{) I-IO~ 0::0(")0 <(CI)U;> , a..o::coC'\l WWCO~ OO~-- gz~~ 0::<(1{)1{) I-S~w O~O::~ wOOo mOSI I- Z W o Z W I- Z a: w 0...1"-0) :::>1{)..- CI((")I"- ZI{)I"- , I o CO I{) Cl)co(") Z"tl{) -- -- I..-..- O"t"t -,,1{)1{) I- ' , I-~w Oo::~ '-O~O OCl)>I LL W IO<o I-Ol"-"t..-o Z 1"-1"-1{) >-C'\II"-co"- Ww I, co"- ~-l~~~9 t;O"t"tN"t !-LL-o----col"- <(0"-"---1:::: fris~~~~ OI~W' U( W I- 0::0 ~ :J 0:: ffw>Owc> LL~>IOa.. I- ZLL..-O wW"-O)co ~IN"t(")I I- S'!";"""-o o::t.(coco";""l- <(<(coco..-<( _a..o~~~a.. wZ"-"-__CI) o<("t"t..-- w-U(U(~O OCD~W' ..- -WO::=-l..- -l~o"""-lo) O->Ow,- a..~>IOo - (")(") I{)I"-I{) I-(")O)C'\I CI) 1 Z I{) "t (") zZwcON9 OOOCOCO"- -CI)Z"t"t1{) I-a:w~--O) ~O::I-"t~~ wO~U(I{)"t a..~O::~wU( OW~O::~-l s~:::>ooLd o...~CI)SIO ~ ...... . CO;:. '? ...... . ~ cD . ~ &5 · ('") M · go. I u;>. ~ w. [j ~ . U I. . -l <( Z o c> Wo:: CI) O::w w ZI- g N OZ<o ~&: ~ fB~~ zw ~ C:::Zm :::>CI) I"- 001"- 0>- 1:::: z-I"- ~~wffi~ o::~~ o ",I{) WOI{) Cl)c><(v~ I~~ ~o:: 0:: I-~o:: ~~~~-g60~ -"w~>CUCl)O> ... w o :> 0:: w CI) 0:: W I I- I{) <( C'\I t- W I"- I{) S<O"- -lOc0 <(";""1"- Q~S; I---"t <(..-1{) Z ~ 0 -l ~ n: CI) o I ~ Z :::> ~ ~ o -0 o Z ::s I CI) <( ..- o I{) l- X w o -l "-0 "tz ~o:: '<( ~>- "t:....l -- -l "-0 ~a.. 0:: 0:: 0 o en t: :> O::Nl1:: I-OW Cl)NQ.. -1-:::> ~xen ~wo:: o -0 <("-LL l"t~ I=~en WN<( ICOen 0"t0:: o::~:> <("to ~U(J: ~~O:: o::O::W ....<(~tL 0~><C .... . . CO · UJ . o . 5; . ct:: . UJ . I- co Z >- · W 0 · ~:;::: . UJ W (~ . o c'" . 0:: uj . 0",;; . LL '"'- Z UJ . W o~ . . . . . . . . . : s .::5 :~ .~ .CI) . Z · S .0 .0 . .. . . . . . . r-----., I 0:: I I ~ 1 I&:(") I I I-WI{)CO(")I za..(")~1{) , ::S~~"1~1 0:: 11.. cO CO ~ ~I W /- _ "t I{) I{) I- ..,. -l -- __ 0) 1 <( ."- -l ..- ..- -- , ~!:!:!W~"t~ I ,<::>-, U;>I{)I /- ~ W ' ,1-.::( 0:: 0:: = >-1 CI) III 0:: 0 """ I- I~[)::: W > 0:::>, >/-I->IO L_____..J r--., I :i 1 I ~~ I I -7 I >-~=O I 0:: Cl::: C'\I I <( (L <0 ,!z CO u;> 1 W C::l C'\I I ~ ....I CO I W~!:! ~ l.......I-l LL..-I IIW<:("t Iz (t:: U( , I~ ca ~ 1 ,g ~~ ~ 1 L__..J r----., 115 1 -"tI 1 !tJ~o I , IW "t I- I O(f)N<( 1~~~~~81 h...J:Z~O"-1 V5:~~0::'?1 1<(lw~:::>~ Ib~~g5~~1 ,8:~s~~' L____..J r----., 1 e5 I I b I l!J II-Q;;;oco I ,z9~C'\I"t Wz I{) ..- I{) , ~ 0 ' CO ~ 11-':J)COcO' I ---; 0:: 1'- ~ CO ..- a.:'SC 1:lC -- ~ ~ I IW ..- ..- __ I W iJ) "t "t ..- I OOU;>L()"t 1~1:lC~uJU;>1 .....'ZO::~-l l~i::>~oLdI L~I~_I~..J . . . . . . . . . . . co ("') ("') It) I CO CO ~ I"- CO L() I{) , CO CO ~ ..- "t L() . ro . c · (i) . E . ~ . 0.. . (i) . o . ~ . o · S · t) · . :0 . :J 0... . (i) .. oS · t5 · CO .. C . 8 · (i) · (/) CO (i) a.. u (i) OJ C CO ..c t) (/) CO ..c t CO ..c t) ~ '" .g . .!!1 '" oS · c · o . u . (i) . .~ . c .. o " ~ . E .. .... 1111 .2 c iii . 1? '" ~ .. '" L- a> "'C c: CI:I E E o u - c: a> "'C '0 c: L- a> - c: a> U l/) c: o .. CI:I L- a> Q. o >- o c: a> Cl L- a> E w EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN HOSLER DAM PROJEcr NO. 1107 - OREGON I. Notification Flow Charts A. Failure is Imminent or Has Occurred B. Potential Hazard is Developing The attached flow charts provide a detailed process of notification for either dam failure/imminent failure or a possible hazardous situation developing. The flow charts detail names, titles, and phone numbers of those who are responsible for notification from the individual observer to the responsible agency representatives. These flow charts also denote the relative priorities of the notification. C. Posting of Flow Charts The EAP has been distributed to all key supervisory and operational employees, as well as those personnel listed on the flow chart. The flow chart is easily identified in the EAP. The Plan itself is located in a prominent site near the telephone and radio transmitter at the Water Filter Plant, the closest site to the dam and with the responsible party that oversees the facility. The EAP is readily available to appropriate plant operators and the City's police and emergency (911) dispatch center personnel. II. Statement of Purpose The primary purpose of this Emergency Action Plan (EAP) is to safeguard lives and reduce damage in the unlikely event of catastrophic failure of Hosler Dam within the Ashland Creek Watershed. This EAP, in total, is one specific section of the City of Ashland's Emergency Action Plan, which identifies all types of emergency procedures for the City. This EAP specifically defines the responsibilities and notification procedures in the unlikely event of dam failure or potential hazard involving the dam. The EAP is designed to promulgate the Federal Emergency Regulatory Commission's regulations and guidelines for emergency procedures. This plan may also be used in the event of significant flooding and overtopping of the dam under extreme flooding conditions along Ashland Creek. III. Project Description Hosler Dam is a concrete arch dam constructed in 1928 in the Ashland Watershed canyon. Hosler Dam, also known as Reeder Gulch, is owned and operated by the City of Ashland, Department of Public Works. Hosler Dam is 118 feet high and impounds approximately 800 acre-feet of water behind the dam (normal spillway crest) in what is commonly referred to as Reeder Reservoir. It is situated on Ashland Creek in the southwestern part of the State of Oregon, three miles south of the City of Ashland and approximately 200 miles south of Salem, Oregon. It impounds water from both the east and west forks of Ashland Creek which have small concrete diversion dam structures on each fork. There are no major streams or other reservoirs upstream from Hosler Dam. G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 CITY OF ASHLAI\ID EAP PAGE 2 The City's Department of Electric Utility operates a power generation plant about 3/4 of a mile downstream of the dam, and the Public Works Department operates the City's Water Treatment Plant immediately downstream of the power plant. A 24-inch steel transmission pipeline (penstock) supplies water from the reservoir behind the dam to the water filtration plant through the power generation plant. Downstream, Ashland Creek travels through the northern end of the City of Ashland until the confluence with Bear Creek at 4.8 miles downstream of the Dam. Bear Creek travels within Jackson County, north through the cities of Talent (approximately 3 miles downstream of the confluence of Ashland and Bear Creeks), Phoenix (approximately 4 miles downstream of Talent), Medford (approximately 5 miles downstream of Phoenix), and into the Rogue River (approximately 7 miles downstream of Medford). The inundation maps include the inundation area through the Ashland Watershed to the City of Phoenix. IV. Emergency Detection, Evaluation and Classification A. Measures for Detection Timely and reliable detection of a potential or imminent dam failure is the key to downstream notification and safety. As discussed under specific responsibilities later in this document, current detection measures include visual monitoring of the dam, water levels behind the dam, SCADA system notification (telemetry) if the water levels behind the dam rise or fall within very short periods of time, and creek level monitoring. The majority of our monitoring data includes visual as well as instrument recording devises. The dam is monitored through telemetry and notifications are through an auto-dialer to Water Treatment Plant personnel. These procedures are detailed in other sections. In addition to the above-cited detection measures, the City has installed additional instrumentation for detection as part of a new automated emergency warning system. Along with the sensor arrays, a day-night camera will be installed at one of the dam transceivers. A picture of the dam will be available on video monitors installed at both the Water Treatment Plant and at the Police Station automatically and/or on demand at each location to allow instantaneous visual verification of failure or imminent failure. Audible alarms will be sounded in the event of failure which is described in Section IV, C. Emergency Classification and in Section VI, Notification Procedures. B. Provisions for Evaluation The dam is approximately 1.2 miles above the Water Treatment Plant. As such the current initial method for evaluation of potential problems is direct visual observations and telemetry warnings. In addition, a new day-night camera is planned to be installed as part of the water line replacement project and will provide a means for instantaneous remote visual observation. Other than in tiimes of complete catastrophic failure, plant personnel, the Public Works Director and experts in dam evaluation would observe the dam to evaluate concerns and potential hazards. The City has used consultants in the past and could also call upon FERC or the US Corps of EnginE~ers to provide assistance in evaluating a potential dam failure. In the absence of G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 CITY OF ASHLAND EAP PAGE 3 the ability to physically observe the dam through vehicle or foot access, helicopter assistance would be used. As earlier described, the Ashland Watershed between the Water Treatment Plant / Power Generation Plant and the dam is through a steep canyon. Extremely high water levels would not allow physical access for observation. C. Emergency Classification The City of Ashland has chosen two basic classifications for emergency action: 1. Failure is Imminent or Has Occurred: In this situation, the warning time frame is significantly diminished. In essence, time has run out and corrective measures to eliminate dam failure would have been exhausted. The EAP-1 notification chart would be activated and evacuation procedures would immediately begin. Once failure occurs, inundation through to the City center has been calculated to be approximately 8 to 10 minutes. Therefore, the City has installed a new automated emergency warning system with audible alarms. The water level sensor arrays installed at the dam would send signals through transceivers which would be received at both the Water Treatment Plant and the Ashland Police Station. The control logic from the sensing arrays would provide a short preset time delay (Le., in the range of 15 to 60 seconds as determined by the City after testing) to allow a quick review of the picture from the remote camera before the audible alarm is given. If there were no human intervention at either the Water Treatment Plant or the Police Station, the warning sirens would automatically operate after the preset time delay. Although unlikely, if this classification has been activated and the dam has not or does not fail, the Public Works Director has the ability to move into the "Potential Hazard" classification and continue with the longer term notification, evaluation and update process. 2. Potential Hazard is DeveloDinq: Because of the daily inspections of the dam, this situation would allow time to notify and gain better understanding of a potential hazardous situation. Under this classification, there should be time to evaluate corrective actions and plan for either corrections or ultimate failure. Reporting procedures will be followed and periodic updates to the situation will allow transition to the "Failure is Imminent" mode as necessary" This classification would also be used for significant flooding and notification procedures. For both classifications there is an initial response and notification procedure as described in the notification flow charts and in the responsibilities sections below. G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 CITY OF ASHLAND EAP PAGE 4 v. General Responsibilities Under the Emergency Action Plan A. Licensee Responsibilities The Water Treatment Plant Operations Division of the Ashland Public Works Department is responsible for maintenance and operations of Hosler Dam and Reeder Reservoir. As such, the Water Treatment Plant Manager and the plant operators are responsible for major decisions relating to emergency situations. Because of the location of the Water Treatment Plant on Ashland Creek below Hosler Dam, the Water Treatment Plant operators are uniquely situated to observe any changes of flow in Ashland Creek, which might indicate a problem or emergency situation at the dam. The Plant Operators have daily responsibilities that include observations of the dam and recordings of the water elevations behind the dam face. The first line supervisors and treatment plant operators are the key personnel who are generally responsible under the Emergency Action Plan. These personnel have been advised of the importance of the Plan and why it is necessary. They are also exercised annually on the proper communications lines, secondary communications and how to apply proper notification procedures under this EAP. B. Responsibility for Notification The Water Treatment Plant operators have primary responsibility for notification of dam failures or any significant changes in the water level behind the dam as shown in the EAP. Their activities are logged in daily operations logs at the Water Treatment Plant. Plant personnel duties include knowing the location of the Plan, thorough study and knowledge of the Plan's content, participation with other key personnel in study sessions of the Plan elements, and participation in review and test sessions of emergency communication and notification procedures. Actions the operators take after completing notification responsibilities depend upon the specific situation. There are not certain sequences predicted for opening or closing of valves or gates and decisions will be made based upon the immediate situation. If there is any doubt as to the actions to be taken, the next level of supervisors (Water Treatment Plant Manager or Public Works Superintendent) is empowered to make the decision or gain additional expertise to make such a decision. The chain of command and notification procedures are shown on the Notification Flow Charts. Public Works key personnel, as indicated on the Notification Flow Charts, will keep local authorities advised of conditions at the dam by use of telephone, radio and/or personal contact, as appropriate or as available. The National Weather Service will be utilized to enhance flood warning information. Jackson County, through the Southern Oregon Regional Communications Center, will be the clearinghouse and the Jackson County Emergency Operations Center will have additional coordination responsibilities for all emergency activities throughout the County. C. Responsibility for Evacuation Should evacuation be required, the City's Emergency Management Plan will be enforced. The Incident Commander (in this case, most likely the Public Works Director) will advise the 911 Emergency Dispatch and evacuation procedures will begin. As a result of the updated inundation G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 CITY OF ASHLAND EAP PAGE 5 maps (2000) and with accurate aerial photography (1998) the City now has very detailed mapping available and evacuation routes, water levels and other pertinent information available for emergency situations. D. Responsibility for Termination and Follow-Up Termination of the emergency will be at the discretion and direction of the City's Incident Commander (in this case, most likely the Public Works Director). Follow-up procedures for the dam are the responsibility of the Public Works Director. Any necessary changes to the EAP or other emergency procedures will be recommended at any level, through the Public Works Director for inclusion in the Plans. E. EAP Coordination Responsibility The designated EAP coordinator, who is responsible for related activities including, but not limited to preparing revisions to the EAP, coordinating EAP tests, etc. is Paula Brown, Public Works Director, direct 541/552-2411 or through clerical staff assistance at 541/488-5587. Daryl McVey, Water Filter Plant Manager, 541/488-5345 is responsible for the surveillance and observations at the dam and for establishing training exercises for plant operators. G:lpub-wrksladminIPB Dam-FERCIEAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 CITY OF ASHLAND EAP PAGE 6 V. Notification Procedures - General The water filtration plant is located on Ashland Creek a short distance below the dam. The level of water behind the dam is monitored by telemetry, as well as daily visual observation of the level of Ashland Creek. Operators man the Water Treatment Plant ten hours a day throughout the year. In addition to the manned work hours, the on-call operator has a phone and is required to respond to plant emergencies 24-hours a day while on duty. There are alarms on the dam that notify the on-call operator by phone alarm if any abnormal rise in water level is observed. These alarms are tied into the lap top computer so that the operators can observe any area of concern and monitor flow measurements. Any abnormal rise in creek flow or drop in dam level that is observed over a period of less than one hour will be observed by the plant operator and the plant operator will alert the Public Works Director, Public Works Superintendent, or water emergency duty person of any abnormality. The plant operator and/or the notified person(s) will then physically check the cause of the rising water. If there is true indication of abnormal conditions, notification procedures will be followed. There will be no problem with public safety in the event that either the East or West Fork diversion dam should fail. These reservoirs contain a small amount of water, which would only cause a small wave in Reeder Reservoir. In the event that Reeder Reservoir is full, there would be no problem at the spillway or in the creek channel due to either of these small diversion structure failures. The notification procedure will follow the sequence noted on the Flow Charts. The first line of communication will be the telephone (line or through cellular phones depending on the availability), followed by radio communication on the City's Public Works communications frequency, followed by personal contact, if necessary. The emergency dispatch monitors all Public Works radio frequencies and can communicate on that frequency as well. In the case of complete dam failure, direct notification of all immediately affected downstream persons and businesses within the limits of inundation may not be possible because of the lack of available warning time. In this situation, and if there is catastrophic dam failure, the flood-wave would reach the City center (the Plaza) in a time period calculated to be approximately 8 to 10 minutes. Therefore, the City has installed an automated audible emergency warning system which relies on independent transceivers and will operate without reliance on the existing telephone system which is vulnerable to failure during catastrophic events. The new sensor array described in Section IV, Emergency Detection, Evaluation and Classification will transmit an alarm signal simultaneously to the Water Treatment Plant and the Police Station. The operator at: the plant or the police dispatcher will have 15 to 60 seconds (as determined by the City after testing) to visually verify failure on the video monitor which receives a signal from the day-night camera at the dam. If the operator or police dispatcher does not take action to terminate the alarm signal by pushing a button within the period of the preset time delay, an audible alarm will automatically be made to the general public. The audible alarms will consist of four warning stations distributed along the edge of the inundated area within City limits. Each warning station consists of four 144 db 311 Hz air powered horns mounted on 20-foot high towers. The horns are powered from 2200 psi, 125 pound air bottles and will be controlled to give a distinct intermittent sound. These horns will have a range of about 1/3 of a mile under G:\pub-wrks\admin\PI3 Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 CITY OF ASHLAND EAP PAGE 7 adverse weather conditions and over 2/3 of a mile under good conditions (above background noise level of 80 db). A. PROPOSED ACTION "FAILURE IS IMMINENT OR HAS OCCURRED" NO WARNING PROVIDED EAP-l Water Filter Plant Manager or Operator on duty will contact Police Department via telephone (911) or radio and evacuate the premises to higher ground. "This is the Ashland Water Treatment Plant Operator. I have received or observed indications that Hosler Dam has or is in immediate danger of failing. I need your help to initiate emergency procedures as outlined in the Emergency Action Plan and the City's Emergency Operations Plan. You need to initiate notification procedures shown on flow chart 'EAP- 1 Failure is Imminent or has Occurred.' NOW! I am evacuating the area and will contact you when I am safe. " Since the City Hall would undoubtedly be damaged or inundated, the Ashland Police Department will take charge of all notifications and communications. Inundation map indicates a time calculated to be approximately 8 to 10 minutes for peak flood wave to reach City Hall. The Chief of Police will take the following action: 1. If the dam has not already failed, manually sound the audible alarm system as part of the notification procedures to rapidly warn the public of imminent failure. 2. Determine if City Hall is still in operation either through phone calls (see 3A below) or visibly driving to the Plaza area and observing the building and the creek. 3. Notify Southern Oregon Regional Communications Center, Millie Tirapelle, Director, 776-7206. 4. A) Notify: >- The City Administrator and all City Hall Department Heads at City Hall ( 488-6002), >- The Public Works Director (552-2411 or 488-5587), ~ The Public Works Service Center (488-5353), or ~ The following individuals at their residences: City Administrator - Gino Grimaldi Public Works Director - Paula Brown Public Works Superintendent - Mike Morrison Sr. Fire Chief - Keith Woodley Police Chief - Mike Bianca 488-1045 482-9560 482-4973 482-7746 488-1490 G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 CITY OF ASHLAND EAP PAGE 8 Director of Electric Utilities - Dick Wanderscheid Parks Director -Don Robertson 482-0105 488-8128 B) Each person listed above will then notify each agency in accordance with notification flow chart - EAP-1. 5. Notify Jackson County Department of Emergency Services - 774-6821 requesting that all affected emergency services downstream from Ashland be notified. 6. In accordance with the City of Ashland's Emergency Management Plan, a Command Operations Center and Information Officer will be established at the Ashland Civic Center, 1175 E. Main Street - or other location if required. NOTE: Attached to this Emergency Action Plan are acknowledgements of involvement of other affected agencies. B. PROPOSED ACTION "POTENTIAL HAZARD IS DEVELOPING' EAP-2 If there is anv Drior indication that Hosler Dam is going to fail or that there are unknowns in which further assessment is necessary, the Water Treatment Plant Manager or Operator on duty shall contact the following personnel by telephone or radio: );> Paula Brown, Director of Public Works 552-2411 (direct line) or 488-5587 (monitored by secretarial staff)- 482-9560 (home) );> Mike Morrison, Public Works Superintendent 488-5353 (monitored by secretarial staff)-Service Center; direct 488-2325 482-4973 (home) );> Gino Grimaldi, City Administrator 488-6002- City Hall (monitored by secretarial staff) 488-1045 (home) The Treatment Plant Manager or Operator on duty will state: "This is the Ashland Water Treatment Plant Operator. I have received or observed indications that Hosler Dam may be experiencing problems with over topping or that a hazardous situation is developing. I need your help to initiate evaluation and possible notification procedures as outlined in the Emergency Action Plan and the City's Emergency Operations Plan. You need to initiate notification procedures shown on flow chart 'EAP- 2 Potential Hazard is Developing.' I am securing the plant and will evacuate the area. I will contact you when I am safe" G:\pub-wrks\admin\PI3 Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 CITY OF ASHLAND EAP PAGE 9 1. City personnel at the Water Filtration Plant will secure the plant to the best of their abilities without endangering themselves, and evacuate the area for higher wound. Once at a safe location, the operator will provide a full assessment to the Public Works Director as soon as time allows. 2. After assessment of the situation and if there is determination that the dam may fail or in danger of significant hazard developing, the Public Works Director will immediately contact the Police Department by telephone (911) and/or radio. 3. The Public Works Director, City Administrator, Police Department and Public Works Superintendent will begin notifications of other agencies as per the notification flow chart on page EAP-2. NOTE: In addition to the above notifications, the Public Works Director or Public Works Superintendent will determine if it would be prudent to lower the water level in the reservoir. If such determination is made, this information will be given to all agencies notified so that appropriate action can be taken by those agencies as water levels in Ashland Creek could be rising and downstream areas could be affected. VI. Preparedness and Preventative Actions A. General Provisions for Surveillance The dam is unmanned and located on Ashland Creek approximately one (1) mile above the water filter plant. The level of water behind the dam is monitored by telemetry, as well as daily visual observation. Water levels will be monitored by sensor array as part of the automated emergency audible warning system. The level of Ashland Creek is visibly monitored daily and flow gages are checked routinely. A day-night camera will be installed in the future to provide an instantaneous picture of the dam automatically and/or on demand on video monitors installed at the Water Treatment (Filter) Plant and at the Police Station. The Water Treatment Plant has operators on duty at the plant 10 hours a day seven days a week throughout the year. There is an operator on-call at all other times. There are alarms on the dam that notify the on-call operator by phone alarm if any abnormal rise in water level is observed. In addition to monitoring at the water filter plant, the dam site is visited daily by the Water Treatment Plant Manager or Operator on duty. The frequency of surveillance of the dam by these personnel is increased during inclement weather or other critical times. B. Surveillance at Remotely Controlled or Unattended Dams The dam level is monitored by computer at the water filtration plant. Should the level of the dam increase or decrease rapidly, (e.g. three feet in five minutes), an audible alarm is activated at the Water Treatment Plant. During that part of the day when the water filter plant is unmanned, all alarms are relayed to the Duty Operator by means of an auto-dialer. The Duty Operator carries a cellular telephone that is dedicated for this purpose. The duty operator can monitor the alarms on the laptop computer system as all are tied together in the SCADA system. In the event that the headwater or the tail-water alarm is activated while the filtration plant is manned, the operator on duty shall, before initiating the Emergency Action Plan, determine G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 em OF ASHLAND EAP PAGE 10 visually whether a problem exists or not. This includes observation of the video monitor which displays a rea I.-time picture of the dam, observation of the water level on the creek, and observation of the dam itself. This is to rule out the possibility of a false alarm. The operator will check the Hosler Dam level readout and the tail-water level readout in the telemetry headquarters panel, to see if there has been any significant drop in the level of the dam, or increase in the level in the creek running through the plant for any significant increases in stream level or stream flow. If there are no significant decreases in dam level or increases in stream level, the alarm will be judged as a false alarm and the operator will resume normal work duties. Should there be a significant decrease (3 feet) in the level of Hosler Dam and a significant increase in the level (2 feet) of the creek running through the plant, the operator will immediately initiate the Emergency Action Plan, Notification Flowcharts: FAILURE IMMINENT or HAS OCCURRED. Once this has been done, the operator will evacuate the premises for higher ground. If the Duty Operator receives an alarm from the water filtration plant while it is unmanned, they will dispatch immediately to the filtration plant. This person can be at the entrance to the watershed, where the water filtration plant and dam are located, in 15 minutes or less. Before arriving at that point, this person will check Ashland Creek as that individual is driving the vehicle up Winburn Way, then Granite Street, looking for significant increases in flow and level of the creek. If none is observed, this person will proceed on to the water filtration plant. Once there, checks of the Hosler Dam level and the tail-water level will be made. If the dam level history does not show any significant decrease (3 feet), and the tail-water level readout has not increased significantly (2 feet), and the stream flow and the level of Ashland Creek has not increased significantly by physical inspection, the alarm will be judged as a false alarm. The Duty Operator will then return home. However, should the duty person observe significant increases in the flow and level of Ashland Creek and decreased level of Hosler Dam, the Police Dispatch Center will be informed at once, to initiate the Emergency Action Plan, Notification Flowchart, Condition: FAILURE IMMINENT or HAS OCCURRED. Duty personnel will evacuate to a safe area. Once safe, the duty person will provide a full detailed report to the Public Works Superintendent and/or Public Works Director. Once confirmation that the alarm is valid and activation of the Emergency Action Plan has begun, the Police Department will begin evacuating residents from the inundation zone. The automated emergency public alarm system may have already sounded if failure of the dam has occurred. C. Response During Periods of Darkness As previously discussed, there are on-duty personnel available 24 hours a day. Although there is no electric service at the dam site, illumination is available through the use of portable generators, owned and operated by the Water Quality Division. This is emergency equipment and is available at all times, day and night, for emergencies and when necessary. Other personnel can be called to assist. Response time is quite short since the on-duty person has a City vehicle and radio / paging equipment available at all times and is required to maintain a 20- minute response time. G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 CITY OF ASHLAND EAP PAGE 11 D. Response During Periods of Adverse Weather Access to the dam is generally by an unimproved, but well maintained road. In adverse weather, four-wheel drive vehicles or other equipment can access the dam. In the case where the road might be flooded or washed out, the dam is accessible by foot by way of a fire trail. Travel time by foot is generally less than 30 minutes to reach the dam face from the water treatment plant. E. Availability and Use of Alternative Systems of Communications The Water Quality Division has radio equipment in all vehicles and also has a number of portable transceivers (radios) available. This radio equipment is available for use at the dam at any time, and in many cases is the most reliable means of communication in the canyon. F. Emergency Supplies and Resources The City of Ashland is well supplied with manpower, equipment and materials for use in emergency situations. In addition, the Water Quality Division can call upon other divisions of the Public Works Department as well as other departments of the City. The City also maintains a list of contract suppliers for both equipment and emergency supplies not generally maintained by the City, but used during emergency situations. In additional to supplies and equipment, the City maintains a list of available resources and professional contacts for assistance in case of emergencies. G. Other Concerns and Actions Water flow into the reservoir is from natural runoff and cannot be completely managed, coordinated or manipulated. The reservoir water surface could be lowered by use of the three valved outlets. Since this reservoir is the sole source of the City's water supply, it is critical that the water level not be lowered except in the case impending disaster. Because of this, operators would not make this decision on their own, but would act only on instruction from their supervisors, who in turn would only act on orders from the responsible person in charge, such as the Public Works Director or in her absence, the City Administrator. There are no actions which can be taken to reduce inflow to the reservoir since there are no upstream dams or control structures. Actions could be taken to alter downstream flows by regulating the outflow of the reservoir by use of existing valves. Such action would be based upon a timely evaluation of the situation and a decision by any of the Water Division supervisors. During the past sixty-eight years, the dam and reservoir system has withstood a number of emergencies such as major floods, fires, and freezing / thawing events. These emergencies were mitigated successfully by personnel and judgement of the managers of the City of Ashland. The City is thoroughly prepared to handle any anticipated emergency. It is not aware of any special concerns or actions to be taken at this time. G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 em OF ASHLAND EAP PAGE 12 VII. Appendix Hosler Dam was constructed in 1928 in Ashland Canyon. It impounds water from both the East and West Forks of Ashland Creek which diverts water from the 7,533 foot high Mount Ashland peak. The darn has been inspected several times in recent years by registered structural engineers and has been certified as structurally sound. The last inspection was by an independent structural consultant approved by FERC, Morrison-Knudsen Engineering, Inc. in 1998. The dam is founded on light-gray, medium-grained granite rock of the Ashland Pluton. The original design and evaluations have certified hard, sound, granite with excellent bearing capacity. The darn is constructed of reinforced concrete and the foundations are sound. Earthquake activity is of low frequency and intensity especially as compared with Puget Sound area in Washington and California. With the exception of two small diversion dams, there are no dams upstream. Based upon the Report of Seismic Analysis of Hosler Dam (Harza Engineering Company, October 26, 2000) the results of the stress analysis using finite element method are all within standards and the dam is deemed safe for future use. There are no nuclear plants within a ten-mile radius of the City's reservoir. The following action plans address both slowly developing failure and instantaneous failure. A. Plans for Postinq the EAP and for Traininq, Testing and Annual Review Postinq the EAP An up-to-date copy of the Emergency Plan and flowchart / notification list is posted in a prominent location near telephone and/ or radio transmitters at the following locations: 1. The Water Treatment Plant operator's office. 2. The City Administrator's office in City Hall (20 E. Main Street). 3. The Director of Public Works office in the Community Development & Engineering Service Building. (51 Winburn Way) 4. The Water Quality Superintendent's office at the Service Center (90 N. Mountain Avenue) 5. The Director of Electric Utilities office at the Service Center (90 N. Mountain Avenue) 6. The Police Department (1175 E. Main Street) Training Training of project operators and other responsible personnel will be conducted annually during the month of March. Items to be covered include, but are not limited to: 1. Description and purpose of the EAP 2. Location of copies of the EAP G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05 CITY OF ASHLAND EAP PAGE 13 3. General responsibilities under the EAP 4. Notification procedure / chain of command 5. Communication systems and alternates 6. Automated Audible Emergency Warning System 7. Emergency supplies and resources 8. Dam-Break Analysis and inundation maps prepared by Harza Engineering Company Subsequent to each annual training session, a statement will be prepared which includes the date of the training, an attendance list of personnel involved, and a summary of topics discussed. A copy of the statement will be included with the annual review of the EAP. Annual Review Each year, the Director of Public Works will review all aspects of the EAP to determine any new developments or other changes downstream or elsewhere which would require any revisions to the EAP. A statement will be furnished to the FERC Regional Director annually that the EAP has been reviewed and the date it was last tested, with inclusion of any needed revision or a statement that no revisions are needed. All plan holders will be provided with dated copies of all revisions. Annual Test An annual test will be made each year during the month of March. All persons, organizations and entities shown on the Flowchart will be contacted. The test will be to verify the following: 1. The chain of command works properly; 2. Personnel names and phone numbers are correct; and 3. The audible Public Emergency Warning System works properly. Items 1 and 2 will be conducted by telephone backed up by radio communication if necessary. Item 3 will be conducted after notification to the general public that a test of the audible warning system will be made. The duration of the audible warning will be very brief (i.e., on the order of 5 to 10 seconds) so that there will be a clear distinction between the test and an actual emergency. The Public Works Director will determine if the test was successful and will furnish the FERC Regional Director within 30 days of the date of the test with a statement that the EAP has been tested and it will include any revisions to the plan or a statement that no revisions are needed as a result of the test. Copies of dated revisions to the EAP resulting from the test will be furnished to all persons on the EAP distribution list. B. Documentation Letters of acknowledgment from contracted agencies and documentation of the most recent consultations with Federal, State and local agencies will be forwarded to the Commission. G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update. doc REV 12/05 CITY OF ASHLAND EAP PAGE 14 C. Inundation Maps A study and analysis of the extent of possible inundation expected upon failure of Hosler Dam was completed by Harza Engineering Company on October 26, 2000. Two required dam break analyses were completed - one for the PMF during sunny day and the second, during flood conditions. A copy of a reduced size (11" x 17'1 set of the inundation maps are enclosed. G:\pub-wrks\admin\PB Dam-FERC\EAP 2005 Update.doc REV 12/05